Why Can't the 3rd Russian President Take Down Putin? - A Lesson from History

The question of why the third president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, could not take down Putin has garnered significant attention in recent years. This query is closely tied to broader geopolitical debates, particularly the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the implications of the Russian military’s actions.

Historical Context

Boris Yeltsin, serving as the first post-Soviet president of Russia from 1991 to 1999, was a significant figure in Russia's transition from a communist state to a democratic one. However, his inability to remove Vladimir Putin from power has been a subject of intense debate, often viewed through the lens of personal ambition, institutional constraints, and the complexities of Russian politics.

The Case of Gorbachev's Capitulation

Gorbatchev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, is often cited as an example of a president who betrayed his country through concession. The analogy is drawn from Gorbatchev's decision to remove all Soviet missiles from Eastern Europe, seen by some as a manifestation of weakness and capitulation. This comparison is sometimes used to argue that Putin is implementing a similar, albeit more subtle, form of capitulation in response to Western pressure.

Modern Analogy and Patriotic Sentiment

Supporters of Putin often capitalize on nationalist sentiment to justify his policies. They argue that Putin’s decisions are rooted in a desire to protect Russia from perceived external threats and to maintain its sovereignty. This narrative is bolstered by a widespread belief among Russians that Western powers, including the United States and Germany, are bent on undermining Russia’s interests.

The media and political discourse in Russia often portray Putin as a hero who is standing strong against external pressures, much like how Gorbatchev is sometimes seen as a traitor. This contrast is frequently used to rally public support for Putin’s policies and to delegitimize criticism of his actions.

Comparisons to German and American Superior Work

A common argument put forth by Putin’s supporters is the idea that Russian civil service could benefit from emulating the efficiency and organization of German and American services. However, this comparison is often used in a disparaging manner, suggesting that Russians are inherently inferior and would need to adopt Western practices to succeed.

This idea is often portrayed as a suggestion for Russian citizens to accept a lower standard of living and less autonomy, reminiscent of the role nannies play in a household - seen as caretakers and enforcers of discipline rather than independent agents.

Role of Foreign Allies and Sanctuaries

The invocation of foreign allies and sanctuaries, such as the ones in the United States and the European Union, is another recurring theme in the discourse surrounding Putin’s rule. Critics argue that Putin’s power is maintained through a complex web of international support, while Putin supporters counter that his leadership is a necessary response to external threats and a return to a strong, centralized government.

The idea of engaging with foreign leaders, such as Blinken and U.S. allies, is often framed as a concession and a sign of weakness. In this view, the West is seen as determined to bring down Putin through diplomatic and economic means, rather than recognizing the complexity of Russian political culture and the deep-seated distrust of external interference.

Ukrainian leaders like Zelensky are often portrayed as figures of hope and liberation, though their Ukrainian heritage is sometimes cited as a point of ambiguity. Putin supporters argue that Zelensky, while appreciated by some, is part of a wider narrative of Western influence and subcontracting of conflicts in Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

The question of whether the third Russian president could have taken down Putin remains complex and multifaceted. It is influenced by historical precedents, political dynamics, and cultural attitudes. The comparison to Gorbatchev's capitulation highlights the very real concerns about the potential for Russian concessions, while the emphasis on German and American superior work reflects a broader set of debates about governance and national identity.

In the current geopolitical climate, these issues continue to shape the narrative of Russian politics and its stance in the international arena, with significant implications for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and beyond.